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ARTICLES
ONCE UPON A TIME IN THE WEST: CITIZENS UNITED,
CAPERTON, AND THE WAR OF THE COPPER KINGS
Larry Howell*
He is said to have bought legislatures and judges as other men buy food and
raiment. By his example he has so excused and so sweetened corruption that
in Montana it no longer has an offensive smell.
-Mark Twain'
[T]he Copper Kings are a long time gone to their tombs.
-District Judge Jeffrey Sherlock 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Recognized by even its strong supporters as "one of the most divisive
decisions" by the United States Supreme Court in years,3 Citizens United v.
* Associate Professor, The University of Montana School of Law. Thanks to the staff of the
Montana Law Review for their invaluable editing assistance. Any remaining mistakes are the author's.
1. Mark Twain, Mark Twain in Eruption "Senator Clark of Montana," 72 (Bernard DeVoto ed.,
Harper & Bros. 1940) (writing in 1907 about William Andrews Clark, one of Montana's three infamous
"Copper Kings").
2. West. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Mont. Atty. Gen., 2010 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412 at *14 (Mont. 1st
Jud. Dist. Oct. 18, 2010), rev'd, West. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen., _ P.3d _, 2011 WL
6888567 (Mont. Dec. 30, 2011).
3. Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big Corporations
Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 639, 641 (2011). The qualifying language
"one of the most divisive" is only necessary because the Supreme Court set its benchmark for dividing
the country just I1 years ago. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Patrick Leahy, made just that point on the floor of the Senate when he labeled Citizens
United "the most partisan decision since Bush v. Gore." Adam Liptak, Washington Meno: A Rare
Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fulipage.html?res=9803E
IDA 133EF93AA 15752COA9669D8B63 (Jan. 29, 2010).
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Federal Election Commission4 was met with a wave of criticism and pre-
dictions of dire consequences for the country's political system. The un-
usually harsh reaction began in the dissenting opinion by four Justices, who
bluntly stated that the decision "threatens to undermine the integrity of
elected institutions across the Nation," as well as "do damage" to the legiti-
macy of the Supreme Court as an institution.5
President Barack Obama amplified that theme during his 2010 State of
the Union address when he described Citizens United as pro-corporate judi-
cial activism while six Justices, including three who signed the 5-4 major-
ity opinion, 6 sat in the audience front and center. "With all due deference to
separation of powers," Obama told the Justices, the Congress, and the Na-
tion, "last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests-including foreign corpora-
tions-to spend without limit in our elections."7 Obama's unusually direct
criticism received even more attention because Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
who voted with the majority in Citizens United, reacted by vigorously shak-
ing his head and muttering "not true, not true" while millions read his lips at
home.8
Justice Alito's dissenting views notwithstanding, two years later the
President's prediction about special-interest floodgates has been proven
correct, 9 although the Court did recently alleviate concerns about allowing
foreign contributions.' 0  And the accuracy of Obama's statement that Citi-
zens United overturned decades of settled law was never in dispute. By
holding that corporations and unions have the right under the free-speech
clause of the First Amendment to make unlimited independent expenditures
4. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that "[n]o sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
5. Id. at 931 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
6. Those three were Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, who
authored the majority opinion, and Samuel A. Alito Jr. Also in attendance were dissenting Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. See Liptak, supra n. 3.
7. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (D.C. Jan. 21, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-ad-
dress).
8. See Liptak, supra n. 3; see also Robert Barnes, A Justice's Reaction: Alito Dissents on Obama
Critique of Court Decision, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/01/28/AR2010012800053.html (Jan. 28, 2010).
9. T.W. Farnam, Corporations Are Sending More Contributions to Super PACs, Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/corporations-are-sending-more-contributions-to-super-pacs/
2012/02/02/gIQAL4dYIQ story.html?hpid=Z2 (Feb. 2, 2012) (reporting, for example, that in 2011 Karl
Rove's American Crossroads "super PAC" received 39 percent of its tens of millions of dollars from
corporations).
10. See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (summarily affirming a lower court ruling uphold-
ing the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting contributions and independent expenditures by
foreign nationals).
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in campaigns for elected office, the Supreme Court not only struck down a
federal statute" and overturned two of its own key campaign-finance deci-
sions, 12 it also effectively struck down laws in 24 states that had long
banned or restricted independent corporate expenditures.13
Or at least it effectively struck down laws in 23 of them. One state has
refused to give up on its century-old ban on corporate campaign expendi-
tures: "Only Montana," as the Washington Post reported, "still wages a
lonely court battle to maintain the ban." 1 4 Montana's lonely struggle be-
came national news' 5 on December 30, 2011, when the Montana Supreme
Court upheld a Montana statute prohibiting corporate expenditures that a
lower court, citing Citizens United, had declared unconstitutional in early
2011.16 That case, formerly known as Western Tradition Partnership, Inc.
v. Attorney General, will almost certainly be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court, which stayed the Montana Supreme Court's decision on
February 17, 2012, at the request of the corporations challenging the stat-
ute.17
Montana's continued effort to restrict independent corporate expendi-
tures in campaigns for elected office is rooted in the State's history of cor-
rupt elections during the War of the Copper Kings, which took place at the
turn of the twentieth century.' 8 At the time, the State was infamous for
what historian K. Ross Toole described as the "massive corruption of the
machinery of government"' 9 that resulted from the willingness of three
11. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (majority) (holding 2 U.S.C. § 441b unconstitutional).
12. Id. (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
13. See Natl. Conf. of St. Legis., Citizens United and the States, Life After Citizens United http://
www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607#1aws (updated Jan. 4, 2011) (noting that while Citizens United
did not directly strike down state laws, "it is likely that states will choose not to enforce these laws" and
"[miany of these states are looking at repealing or re-writing these laws to avoid legal challenges").
14. Robert Barnes, Citizens United Decision Reverberates in Courts Across Country, Washington
Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/citizens-united-decision-reverberates-in-courts-across
country/2011/05/20/AFbJEK9G story.html (May 22, 2011).
15. The New York Times alone published three editorials in 15 days supporting the Montana Su-
preme Court's decision. See Montana and the Supreme Court, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/02/14/opinion/montana-and-the-supreme-court.html?_r=4 (Feb. 13, 2012); The Court and
Citizens United II, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/the-supreme-court-
and-citizens-united-take-2.html?_r-2 (Feb. 21, 2012); and Undermining State Campaign Laws, New
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/29/opinion/undermining-state-campaign-laws.html?_r
=2 (Feb. 28, 2012).
16. West. Tradition Partn., Inc., - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *1.
17. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, _ S. Ct. -, 2012 WL 521107 (Feb. 17, 2012). The
caption of the case has changed because the lead plaintiff has changed its name. This article will use
"Western Tradition Partnership" when referring to the litigation in Montana's courts, and "American
Tradition Partnership" when referring to the case before the United States Supreme Court.
18. For a good overview of this "legendary struggle between mining barons," see Michael P. Ma-
lone & Richard B. Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries 152-177 (U. of Wash. Press 1976).
19. K. Ross Toole, Twentieth-Century Montana: A State of Extremes 104 (U. of Okla. Press 1972).
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mining barons, or "copper kings," to spend millions of dollars in their battle
to control both Montana's vast copper deposits and its government. 20 That
corruption led fed-up Montana voters to enact by citizen initiative the
State's first ban on corporate campaign expenditures, the Corrupt Practices
Act of 1912,21 which was the precursor to the statute at issue in Western
Tradition.22 One hundred years later, that same history of corruption, ac-
cording to the Montana Supreme Court, provided the compelling interest
necessary to uphold the Montana statute2 3 even though Citizens United
struck down a similar federal statute as facially unconstitutional. 24 As one
opposing amicus brief filed in the Montana Supreme Court phrased it, the
State is asserting "a 'Montana Exception' to the Free Speech Clause" based
on Montana's unique history of corrupt elections a century ago.2 5
This article first details the extent of that corruption, which was so
pervasive that in 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt's Solicitor General,
echoing Mark Twain, 2 6 described Montana as a place "where open confes-
sions of sales of political and even judicial influence were lightly looked
upon. "27 The article describes three examples that the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration certainly had in mind. The first involved the election of copper king
William Andrews Clark to the United States Senate in 1899. Clark won his
election through a brazen bribery campaign that ended up being the focus of
an investigation by the United States Senate, which forced Clark to resign a
few months after taking office. 2 8 The other two examples concern corrupt
district judges elected in Butte in 1900, Edward Haney and William
Clancy, who were widely believed to have been "bought and paid for"29 by
another copper king, F. Augustus Heinze, although direct bribery was never
proven. 30 Their numerous biased rulings in Heinze's favor in some of the
most high-stakes litigation in the United States had substantial impacts on
the state and the nation. In fact, the results of Clancy's rulings in particular
20. See Michael P. Malone, The Battle for Butte: Mining and Politics on the Northern Frontier,
1864-1906 53-56, 80-83, 147-158 (U. Wash. Press 1981).
21. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 201.
22. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227 (2011).
23. West. Tradition Partn. - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at **7-9.
24. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
25. Amicus Curiae Br. of Ctr. for Competitive Pol. at 8, West. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen.,
2011 WL 6888567.
26. Twain, supra n. 1, at 72.
27. Donald MacMillan, Smoke Wars: Anaconda Copper, Montana Air Pollution, and the Courts,
1890-1924 173 (Mont. Historical Socy. Press 2000).
28. Malone, supra n. 20, at 126.
29. Toole, supra n. 19, at 109.
30. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 172; see also Patrick v. State, 257 P.3d 365, 370 (Mont.
2011).
Vol. 7328
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are still felt in Montana today in significant ways, not the least of which
was the passage of Montana's Corrupt Practices Act.3 '
The article next analyzes Citizens United and how its sweeping con-
clusions about independent campaign expenditures and corruption conflict
with the way the Court treated those same expenditures a year earlier in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 32 which involved a judicial election.
The article then discusses Western Tradition Partnership. In that case,
Montana successfully argued that Citizens United did not invalidate Mon-
tana's 100-year-old ban on independent corporate expenditures because the
law was originally enacted directly by citizens trying to take their state back
from the corporations that had seized control of it. 3
Surprising many observers, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the
statute in a 5-2 decision, thus giving the United States Supreme Court a
chance to reconsider its ill-advised decision in Citizens United. At least two
Justices on the Court apparently are willing to do just that. On February 17,
when the Court granted American Tradition's application for a stay of the
Montana decision, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, while supporting the stay,
voiced their view that it was already time to revisit Citizens United:
Montana's experience, and experience elsewhere since this Court's decision
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, make it exceedingly difficult
to maintain that independent expenditures by corporations "do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption." A petition for certiorari will give
the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the huge sums cur-
rently deployed to buy candidates' allegiance, Citizens United should con-
tinue to hold sway. 34
Human nature and political ideology being what they are, however, the
likelihood seems small that any of the five members of the Citizens United
majority would confess so soon to making such a monumental mistake.
Various experts, including one of the dissenting Montana justices, have pre-
dicted a summary reversal without briefs on the merits.35 And absent a
confession of error by at least one of their colleagues, not even Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer apparently think the Western Tradition decision can
stand. Although the Montana Supreme Court explained in detail why its
decision did not conflict with Citizens United because of the state's unparal-
31. W. William Leaphart, First Right of Recusal, 72 Mont. L. Rev. 287, 287-289 (2011); Malone,
supra n. 20, at 201.
32. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
33. West. Tradition Partn., - P.3d at -, 2011 WL 6888567 at *9.
34. Ain. Tradition Partn,., Inc., - S. Ct. -, 2012 WL 521107 (citations omitted).
35. West. Tradition Partn., P.3d at , 2011 WL 6888567 at *41 (Nelson, J., dissenting). See
also Richard L. Hasen, Occupy the Super PACs, Slate (available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news
and-politics/politics/201 2/02/justice-ruth-bader.ginsburg-is-ready-to-speak out on-thedanger.of
super pacs-.html) (Feb. 20, 2012).
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leled history of elections corrupted by outside corporate interests, 3 6 Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer indicated they were not persuaded. Even though they
announced their interest in revisiting Citizens United, they wrote that they
voted to grant the stay because "lower courts are bound to follow this
Court's decisions until they are withdrawn or modified."3 7 Therefore, with-
out an abrupt change of course by the Court, Montana's law, like those of
the 23 states with similar laws, 38 cannot survive the sweeping language of
Citizens United.
However, even if the Court holds that the law is unconstitutional when
applied to partisan political elections of legislators and executive branch
officials, this article argues that the ban on independent corporate expendi-
tures should be upheld when applied to judicial elections, which all but 11
states require in some form.39 Those elections, which do not exist at the
federal level, are different in fundamental and obvious ways from elections
for legislative and executive branch positions. The United States Supreme
Court implicitly recognized as much in Caperton, decided the year before
Citizens United, when it held that large independent campaign expenditures
on behalf of judicial candidates pose a "serious, objective risk of actual
bias" 40 and "offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to . .. lead
him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true" in deciding cases important
to the person or entity making the expenditure.4 1 Yet the majority opinion
in Citizens United only referenced Caperton in one cursory, four-sentence
paragraph in which it failed to draw any distinction between judicial and
political elections. 4 2
The logical way to reconcile Caperton and Citizens United is to recog-
nize that because judicial elections are fundamentally different from politi-
cal elections, states should be allowed to shield them from the risk of cor-
ruption posed by unlimited independent corporate expenditures. The sole
purpose of corporate campaign expenditures, given the self-interested na-
ture of corporations, is to support candidates perceived as sympathetic to
the financial or political interests of the corporation. A corporation's "legal
loyalties necessarily exclude patriotism" 43 and other civic virtues. That dis-
tinguishes corporate citizens from flesh-and-blood citizens, who are at least
capable of acting in the best interest of society even when self-interest urges
36. West. Tradition Parin. _ P.3d at , 2011 WL 6888567 at **7-9.
37. Am.Tradition Partn., - S. Ct. -, 2012 WL 521107.
38. See Natl. Conf. of St. Legis., supra n. 13.
39. Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The Inpact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections 2, http://
www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice.pdfnocdn=1 (May 5, 2010).
40. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (internal quotations omitted).
41. Id. at 2261.
42. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
43. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393 n. 245 (2009).
30 Vol. 73
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a different course of conduct. And that difference means that a ban on
independent corporate expenditures in judicial elections not only fulfills a
compelling governmental interest; it also is narrowly tailored, because the
problem is with the fundamentally self-interested nature of corporations.
Corporate self-interest is particularly at odds with society's vital interest in
a judiciary free of bias toward special interests. In fact, corporate self-inter-
est represents a type of "corruption"-a disregard of the public good-that
the Framers of the Constitution not only recognized as "a central threat to
government," but one "they believed would eventually founder America."44
Therefore, even if the Supreme Court strikes down Montana's Corrupt
Practices Act as a whole, the Supreme Court should use American Tradition
Partnership to revisit the issue of independent corporate expenditures in
judicial elections and reconsider at least that aspect of Citizens United.
II. "THE MONTANA SITUATION"
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, wili not cause the electo-
rate to lose faith in our democracy.
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 45
In the late nineteenth century, copper became perhaps the most impor-
tant strategic mineral in the world, as the rapid spread of electricity and
telephones led demand to skyrocket. 4 6 As a result, the rough-and-tumble
frontier mining town of Butte, Montana, which sat on top of almost limit-
less deposits of copper ore, became known as "the richest hill on earth."47
Those underground riches made Montana, and Butte in particular, the site
of one of the more corrupt and colorful battles of industrial titans the coun-
try has ever seen. The War of the Copper Kings was fought on various
levels: by hundreds of miners below ground with fire hoses, slaked lime,
and even dynamite;48 by scores of lawyers49 in court with lawsuits, injunc-
44. Id. at 348, 374. As Professor Teachout persuasively explains in a subsequent article, the Fram-
ers-as well as Supreme Court Justices serving before the mid-twentieth century-would be astounded
at the current Court's single-minded focus in political campaign cases on protecting free-speech rights,
rather than on the greater public good of preventing corruption of government. "In the nineteenth-
century cases involving money and politics, speech concerns were never mentioned, but corruption
concerns always were." Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How Anar-
chists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 Harv. L. & Policy Rev. 163,
165-166 (2011). Something, perhaps, an originalist such as Justice Scalia might want to ponder.
45. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (Kennedy, J., writing for the majority).
46. Malone, supra n. 20, at 34-35.
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. at 181.
49. Toole, supra n. 19, at 112 (noting that by 1902 one copper king, F. Augustus Heinze, had 37
attorneys on his staff and was involved in almost 100 lawsuits involving mining properties worth nearly
$200 million).
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tions, appeals, and writs;50 and, most importantly, by corporate officers and
their bagmen with seemingly endless amounts of cash to buy votes, news-
papers, and politicians. 5 '
A. Senator William Andrews Clark
The 1899 election of copper king William Andrews Clark to the
United States Senate is the most notorious example of Montana's political
corruption, even drawing the critical eye of Mark Twain, who called him "a
shame to the American nation." 52 One historian described events surround-
ing Clark's election as "one of the most remarkable, most sordid political
spectacles in the history of the United States." 5 3 Clark was one of the rich-
est men in America at the time, reputedly worth $50 million in 1900, and
was arguably Montana's most influential citizen, having served as presiding
officer at both the 1884 and 1889 Montana constitutional conventions.54
Yet his most fervent desire was to become a member of the United States
Senate.55  To satisfy that desire, Clark reportedly was willing to spend as
much as a million dollars of his fortune to bribe state legislators,5 6 who
elected senators until adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, at
the rate of up to $10,000 per vote.57 When later asked to justify his bribery,
he reportedly said: "I never bought a man who wasn't for sale."5 8
Clark prevailed despite widespread public knowledge of the bribery
scheme. But it took him many more rounds of voting than expected; late in
the game he had to raise the amount offered to as much as $50,000 per
legislator.59 In the end, Clark may have paid more than $430,000 for 47
legislators' votes and reportedly offered another $200,000 to 13 more who
refused the bribes. 6 0 Clark's celebration was short-lived, however, as com-
50. The corruption in Butte's district courts even led the Montana Supreme Court to invent a previ-
ously unknown writ that allowed it to immediately review discretionary pretrial rulings by lower court
judges-Clancy in particular-without having to wait for appeal from a final judgment, which could
take years. See Larry Howell, "Purely the Creature of the Inventive Genius of the Court": State ex rel.
Whiteside and the Creation and Evolutiion of the Montana Supreme Court's Unique and Controversial
Writ of Supervisory Control, 69 Mont. L. Rev. I (2008).
51. See Malone. supra n. 20, at II1- 130.
52. Twain, supra n. 1, at 72.
53. Malone, supra n. 20, at 111.
54. Id. at 196; see also James McClellan Hamilton, History of Montana: From Wilderness to State-
hood 271 (Merrill G. Burlingame ed., 2d ed.. Binford & Mort 1970).
55. Malone, supra n. 20, at 111.
56. Adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index, $1,000,000 in 1899 bribes would be
the equivalent of more than $25.000,000 in bribes today. See S. Morgan Friedman, The Inflation Calcu-
lator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ (accessed Feb. 8, 2012).
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. (noting the quote may be apocryphal).
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 120.
32 Vol. 73
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plaints from anti-Clark Montanans led the United States Senate Committee
on Privileges and Elections to hold hearings from January through April
1900, investigating the manner by which Clark had been elected. 6 1 Those
legislators who took Clark's money were subpoenaed to explain in person
before the Committee how they had suddenly acquired such wealth. Many
"severely embarrassed themselves and their home state" in the process, 62
including one who denounced his own prior sworn statement that he had
been bribed as a "pack of dam [sic] lies." 6 3 The national press was appalled
by the sad state of affairs in Montana. As one reporter noted, the hearings
had shown what "not overly scrupulous multi-millionaires can accomplish
for the political degradation of a commonwealth."64
Even the three justices on the Montana Supreme Court were dragged
into the scandal. Served with subpoenas by federal marshals, they were
forced to travel from Helena to Washington, D.C., in the middle of winter,
to testify about how Clark's agents had tried unsuccessfully to bribe them in
a related case, with one being offered as much as $100,000 to vote for the
outcome Clark wanted.65 Despite some unpleasant cross-examination by
Clark's lawyers, the justices' reputations remained largely unsullied, and
their credible testimony was cited by the Committee as deserving of "spe-
cial consideration" 66 when it unanimously declared Clark's election "null
and void on account of briberies, attempted briberies, and corrupt practices
by his agents." 67 Clark resigned to avoid expulsion by the full Senate.68
61. See Sen. Comm. on Privileges and Elections, The Right and Title of William A. Clark to a Seat
as Senator from the State of Montana, 56th Cong. (Jan. 5, 1900) [hereinafter Sen. Comm.]. This three-
volume, 3,000-page compilation includes documents, exhibits, and testimony from the United States
Senate Committee hearings into Clark's corrupt efforts to become a member of the world's most exclu-
sive club, as well as from various related proceedings in Montana.
62. Malone, supra n. 20, at 125.
63. Sen. Comm. at 1085-1087.
64. Malone, supra n. 20, at 129.
65. Sen. Comm. at 1631-1668, 1732-1742.
66. Sen. Comm. Rpt. 56-1052 at 14 (Apr. 23, 1900).
67. Id. at 1. For reasons that will become clear during this article's discussion of Citizens United
below, it is worth noting that the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections defined corrupt practices
to include more than quid pro quo bribery and attempted bribery. See infra nn. 165-177.
68. Malone, supra n. 20, at 126. Clark was not yet ready to give up, though, and instead engaged in
one last desperate effort to reclaim his seat, which only served to besmirch Montana's reputation even
more. Before Clark formally submitted his resignation letter, Clark's political allies in Montana lured
the Governor, who opposed Clark, out of state. Clark then submitted his letter to the Lieutenant Gover-
nor, who supported Clark. As acting governor, the Lieutenant Governor immediately appointed Clark to
the seat he had just resigned. The Governor, upon learning of the episode, called it "another one of the
many dirty tricks, perjuries and crimes resorted to by Clark." He revoked the appointment when he
returned to Montana, but Clark ultimately prevailed when he won the Senate seat without incident the
next year after his supporters gained control of the legislature in the 1900 election. Clark served one
undistinguished term and did not run again. Id. at 126-130, 148-156, 195 (internal quotations omitted).
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The entire episode exposed the nation to what the Committee de-
scribed in its recommendation to expel Clark as "the bad repute into which
the State had fallen." 69 Perhaps the only bright spot was that Clark's 1899
election campaign ultimately helped ensure adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, which took election of senators away from easily bribed state
legislators and gave it directly to voters.70
B. The Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, Montana
The "Montana situation," as the Roosevelt Administration referred to
the state's corrupt political culture, also included judges among the elected
officials who were for sale.71 In particular, two Butte district court judges,
William Clancy and Edward Harney, serve as cautionary tales about the
dangers of allowing corporate interests to spend freely to elect judges.
In the early 1900s, F. Augustus "Fritz" Heinze was engaged in a fierce
legal battle with the Amalgamated Copper Company. Controlled by some
of the directors of Standard Oil, including Henry Rogers and William Rock-
efeller, Amalgamated Copper had recently taken ownership of the famous
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, which had been created by the third
copper king, Marcus Daly.7 2 Daly died in November 1900,73 shortly after
"the most turbulent and complex election in Montana's history."74 Before
that election, Heinze and Clark formed an alliance against Daly and Amal-
gamated Copper.75 Clark's goal was to elect enough supporters to the Mon-
tana Legislature that he would not have to bribe them to be elected to the
United States Senate this time. Heinze's goal was to control the district
court judges in Butte so he could continue to tie up Amalgamated Copper in
court. 7 6 Both were successful.77
With Clancy's re-election and Harney's election, those two judges
could control the docket in Butte district court by outvoting the independent
third judge, thus allowing Heinze's judges to decide which cases were as-
signed to which judge.78' As a result, Heinze consistently received
favorable but often legally unsound rulings from the two judges he had
helped elect. 7 9 That was especially true of Clancy, who presided over most
69. Sen. Comm. Rpt. 56-1052 at 15.
70. Hamilton, supra n. 54, at 600.
71. MacMillan, supra n. 27, at 173.
72. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 158.
73. Id. at 169.
74. Malone, supra n. 20, at 148.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 148-149.
77. Id. at 159-160.
78. Id. at 160.
79. Id. at 144, 160, 170.
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of Heinze's and Amalgamated Copper's competing claims to the tens of
millions of dollars of ore under Butte.80 Most of Clancy's pretrial decisions
on who controlled various mines could not be appealed until after a final
judgment in the litigation, which, thanks to Clancy's willingness to drag
matters out, was often years away.8' Nor did Montana have a statute al-
lowing parties to disqualify judges for alleged bias. 82 So Heinze's strategy
was to gain control and mine the disputed claims while the litigation was
still in the trial courts of Butte, and to keep it there as long as possible. 3
Of the two judges doing Heinze's bidding, Harney's conduct was the
more shocking, thanks to one case involving not just allegations of bribery
but also illicit love letters. Harney, according to the Montana Supreme
Court, engaged in a "carnival of drunkenness and debauchery" with a fe-
male employee of Heinze's company during a bench trial in which the com-
pany was the defendant. 84 But Clancy's misconduct was by far the more
significant due to its lasting consequences. In fact, Clancy might, unfortu-
nately, be the most noteworthy judge in Montana history because of the far-
reaching impact his biased rulings had-not just on Montana's reputation,
but on its current laws and judicial procedures.85
1. The Honorable Edward Harney
One of the more significant cases in which Clancy and Harney pre-
sumably exercised their control over the Butte docket involved a small but
strategically located mine known as the Minnie Healy. The case was as-
signed to Harney for a bench trial in 1901. Heinze claimed he bought the
property under an oral agreement from Miles Finlen. Finlen claimed there
had been no sale and sued. He was backed by his friend Marcus Daly and
Amalgamated Copper because they feared that Heinze would use the Min-
nie Healy, which was adjacent to valuable Amalgamated Copper mines, to
steal ore from those mines or even try to claim ownership of the ore under
mining's apex law.8 6
Before his election, Harney was known as a talented trial attorney, but
had become a "hard drinker who had fallen into a life of dissolution."87
After the Minnie Healy bench trial, Harney ruled in Heinze's favor, and
80. See Howell, supra n. 50, at 32-39.
81. Malone, supra n. 20, at 172-173.
82. Leaphart, supra n. 31, at 288.
83. Howell, supro n. 50, at 33-34.
84. Finlen v. Heinze, 73 P. 123, 129 (Mont. 1903).
85. Leaphart, supra n. 31, at 287-289.
86. Malone, supra n. 20, at 169. The apex law allowed the owner of property on which a vein of
ore surfaced, or apexed, to mine that vein wherever it went underground, even if it moved laterally under
the property of others. Id. at 144.
87. Id. at 170.
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Finlen appealed. In a remarkable opinion, the Montana Supreme Court or-
dered a new trial based on Harney's conduct outside the courtroom.88 The
Court described in detail how Harney, who was married with a family, had
an affair during the trial with a woman, Ida Brackett, who worked for
Heinze's company. 89 The two exchanged letters, which Amalgamated Cop-
per's lawyers somehow obtained and submitted with affidavits to the Court
during the appeal.90 The justices were blunt in their assessment of Harney's
conduct:
[T]he district judge who tried this cause was completely lost to all sense of
decency and propriety, and ... he made of the occasion, while off the bench,
a carnival of drunkenness and debauchery, in company with a female em-
ployd of [Heinze's] Montana Ore Purchasing Company, one of the defendants
to the action. 9'
A letter from Brackett to Harney, which became known popularly as
the "dearie" letter because of its salutation, contained an offer of financial
assistance to Harney, reminded him "who his friends were" before he be-
came a judge, informed Harney that Brackett had been authorized to prom-
ise him certain "generous[ ]" things after he left the bench, and referred to
statements that Harney had made to her about the evidence in the Minnie
Healy case.92 The Court wrote that "[t]here is absolutely nothing in that so-
called 'dearie' letter which could with any show of propriety be the proper
subject of discussion between the judge trying a cause and an employ6 of
the one of the parties to the action . . . ."93 Harney's receptive response to
Brackett, in which he wrote that he would be "glad to talk further with [her]
about the subject therein mentioned," outraged the Court even more. 94 The
final straw was that Harney's own affidavit, which the Court said was
"most remarkable for what it does not say," failed to deny the allegations. 95
The Court concluded by stating:
No judgment of a court of justice so tainted with corruption as the record
leaves this should stand, and its cancellation in this instance will be the evi-
dence of the determination of this court to pursue to the utmost its constitu-
tional and lawful authority, to the end that public confidence in our judicial
system may not be lessened, and that the fountain of justice may be kept
pure.9 6
88. Finlen, 73 P. at 131.
89. Id. at 129.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 128-129.
92. Id. at 129.
93. Id.
94. Finlen, 73 P. at 129.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 130-131. It was never proven, however, that either Harney or Clancy ever received direct
quid pro quo bribes. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 172.
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The Court then granted Finlen a new trial before a different judge.
Unfortunately for him and Amalgamated Copper, the new judge was Wil-
liam Clancy.97 More importantly, assigning the case to Clancy would, as
explained below, result in Montana's ultimate degradation.
2. The Honorable William Clancy
Clancy was first elected judge in Butte as a Populist in 1896, four
years before Harney and before Heinze's legal battles heated up.98 But he
soon became "the key to Heinze's political power" due to his "unflinching
loyalty" 99 and the convenient fact that Heinze's cases always seemed to end
up assigned to Clancy through "some clerical jugglery."100 A "curbstone
lawyer of . . . little education," 10 Clancy was well liked by the working
class, who considered him one of them and believed he would "safeguard
the interests of the common man from the capitalistic grasp of the pluto-
crats."l 02 Those common men also appreciated his unkempt appearance,
which often included remnants of past meals and tobacco juice in his flow-
ing white beard. 03
Even before Amalgamated Copper was formed in April 1899, Heinze
and his Montana Ore Purchasing Company had already begun their legal
battles. Heinze had filed several lawsuits against the Boston & Montana
Consolidated Copper & Silver Mining Company, which would later be-
come part of Amalgamated Copper.Yo4 Although no one ever proved that
Heinze directly bribed Clancy, 05 his bias in favor of Heinze had become
noticeable to the Montana Supreme Court as early as 1898, when it first
began chastising him in its opinions. For instance, in November 1898, the
Court found Clancy had abused his discretion in refusing to issue an injunc-
tion against Heinze's company in a suit for trespassing on another mining
claim. Although even Clancy had found that the evidence supported the
injunction, the Court said he had refused to issue it "on the wholly untena-
ble ground" that it would put some of Heinze's miners out of work.'0 6 The
Court also criticized Clancy's reliance on a statute to support another ruling
97. Malone, supra n. 20, at 171.
98. Id. at 144.
99. Id.; see also Howell, supra n. 40, at 32-39.
100. Malone, supra n. 20, at 143-144.
101. C. B. Glasscock, The War of the Copper Kings: Builders of Butte and Wolves of Wall Street
156-157 (Grosset & Dunlap 1935).
102. Id. at 157 (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id.
104. Malone, supra n. 20, at 139, 141.
105. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 172.
106. Butte & Bos. Consol. Mining Co. v. Mont. Ore-Purchasing Co., 55 P. 112, 113 (Mont. 1898).
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that the Court reversed, stating that the statute was "not susceptible of the
interpretation which the court below gave it."1o7
A few months later, the Court again used strong words in reversing
Clancy, this time for granting Heinze a preliminary injunction preventing
his opponent from mining on its own property, even though Heinze's own
expert witnesses did not support his claim for trespass. But the Court was
particularly offended that Clancy had prohibited the defendant from suing
Heinze without an order from Clancy authorizing the litigation in advance.
The Court held that Clancy "violated the plainest rules which confine [his]
power within the bounds of law and sound legal discretion." 0 8
As long as Clancy's biased pretrial rulings for Heinze could come
before the Court on direct appeal, as in the two preliminary injunction cases
discussed above, the Court could reverse Clancy's ruling and undo the dam-
age. But when his rulings involved crucial pretrial matters that were inter-
locutory, and therefore not appealable until after entry of final judgment,
the Court was in a quandary. No matter how unfair a ruling might be, the
Court's hands were tied until the case came to it on direct appeal after final
judgment.109 Under Montana law, the Court could not even issue an ex-
traordinary writ, such as certiorari or prohibition, as long as Clancy had not
exceeded his jurisdiction. So in another lawsuit, when Heinze asked Clancy
to appoint one of Heinze's cronies as receiver for a competing mining com-
pany pending trial-effectively giving Heinze himself control over the
company and its $40 million in assets-the Supreme Court issued a series
of opinions acknowledging it was powerless to review Clancy's rulings be-
cause he had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.1'0 Even if Clancy was bi-
ased in favor of Heinze, the Court held it could do nothing at this stage:
We cannot grant the writ upon the showing made of Judge Clancy's prejudice
or enmity. . .. The facts that Judge Clancy does not like . .. counsel for
relators, that he has decided various cases against relators, and is on friendly
terms with the officers of [Heinze's] Montana Ore-Purchasing Company, and
may not select a fit person as receiver, if he appoints one, are far from suffi-
cient to oust the lower court of jurisdiction.1 1 '
107. Id. at 114.
108. Mont. Ore-Purchasing Co. v. Bos. & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 56 P. 120, 124
(Mont. 1899).
109. Howell, supra n. 50, at 35-36.
110. See State ex rel. Bos. & Mont. Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 56
P. 219 (Mont. 1899) [hereinafter Bos. & Mont. I]; State ex rel. Bos. & Mont. Consol. Copper & Silver
Mining Co. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 56 P. 281 (Mont. 1899); State ex rel. Bos. & Mont. Consol. Copper
& Silver Mining Co. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 56 P. 687 (Mont. 1899); State ex rel. Bos. & Mont. Consol.
Copper & Silver Mining Co. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 56 P. 865 (Mont. 1899).
111. Bos. & Mont. 1, 56 P. at 226.
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The four opinions by the Court on this issue led one historian to write
that "Heinze fared quite well with the Supreme Court . .. . 1"112 But those
opinions actually reveal the Court's increasing frustration with both Clancy
and the limits on the Court's own power to do anything about him. The
Court would soon do something to address both, but only after the justices,
"men of unimpeachable character and the highest integrity,"' 13 had been
splattered with the mud of Montana's corruption themselves. As noted
above, at the same time the justices were frustrated by their inability to
control Judge Clancy, they were subpoenaed to make the long trip to Wash-
ington D.C. in the winter of 1900, to be questioned about their own honesty
before an investigative committee of the Senate.1 14 That unpleasant trip
could not help but bring home to the justices the impact Montana's corrup-
tion was having on the reputation of the state's elected officials, including
themselves.115
As a result, less than a year after their forced visit to Washington, the
Court created a new and previously unknown writ allowing it to immedi-
ately review crucial but non-appealable pretrial interlocutory rulings by trial
judges like Clancy.' 16 In State ex rel. Whiteside v. District Court of First
Judicial District, the Court announced the creation of a new writ of supervi-
sory control that allowed the Court great latitude "to control the course of
litigation in the inferior courts."' 17 The writ remains in active use today
and is codified in the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure.",,
Little doubt exists that the writ was invented largely to control Clancy,
and to a lesser extent Harney. Between late 1900, when the writ was cre-
ated, and early 1905, when Clancy and Harney left office after losing re-
election bids, the Supreme Court discussed issuing the writ of supervisory
control 29 times. All but three of them involved those two Butte judges,
and most involved Clancy.'1 9 The unique and powerful writ of supervisory
control, which has sparked considerable disagreement over the decades
within Montana's bench and bar and among delegates to Montana's 1972
Constitutional Convention, 12 0 is therefore one of the significant and lasting
impacts that Clancy's corruption has had on Montana.
Two additional significant and lasting impacts arose from Clancy's
handling of the Minnie Healy case, one directly and the other indirectly.
112. Malone, supra n. 20, at 144.
113. Hamilton, supra n. 54, at 592.
114. Supra nn. 65-67.
115. See Howell, supra n. 50, at 40-44.
116. Id. at 45-49; see also Leaphart, supra n. 31, at 287-288.
117. State ex rel. Whiteside v. Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist., 63 P. 395, 400 (Mont. 1900).
118. Leaphart, supra n. 31, at 287-288; Mont. R. App. P. 14(3).
119. Howell, supra n. 50, at 48.
120. See id. at 49-71.
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After sitting on the case for several years with little action, on October 22,
1903, Clancy ruled in favor of Heinze and awarded him full ownership of
the Minnie Healy.121 At the same time, he ruled in another lawsuit that
Amalgamated Copper, a foreign corporation, could not buy any Montana
mining companies without the consent of every shareholder, which effec-
tively meant that Amalgamated Copper was illegal and Heinze had won the
war.12 2 Amalgamated Copper's response was swift and brutal. Although
the Supreme Court would eventually reverse Clancy, the company was not
going to wait the months necessary for that. Instead, Amalgamated Copper
ordered the immediate shut down of most of its Montana operations.12 3
The "Great Shutdown" threw the majority of Montana's labor force, more
than 15,000 workers, suddenly out of work.12 4 And before Amalgamated
Copper would resume operations, it issued a demand to Governor Joseph
Toole. Unless he called a special session of the Legislature to pass a "Fair
Trials" bill, allowing litigants to disqualify a trial judge based on the mere
allegation of bias, it would remain shut down. 1 2 5
The Governor resisted Amalgamated Copper's demand for more than
two weeks, but on November 10, 1903, he acquiesced and agreed to call the
special session in December so that Montana's workers could survive the
winter.126 The Legislature quickly passed the bill Amalgamated Copper
demanded, 27 leading to widespread condemnation of Montana for giving in
to corporate blackmail. As one out-of-state newspaper noted, "It took the
Amalgamated Copper Company just three weeks to coerce Montana into
falling on her knees with promises of anything that big corporation might
want." 128
Subsequently, the Montana Supreme Court reluctantly held that the
bill was constitutional, despite its unprecedented breadth.12 9 At the time,
there were only 15 district judges in the entire state, but the Fair Trials
bill-or Clancy Bill, as it became known-allowed each party to disqualify
up to five judges each simply by alleging they were biased.13 0 Fittingly, the
case in which the Court upheld the Fair Trials bill involved Clancy, who
had refused to follow the Act and disqualify himself after being accused of
bias.131 As with William Clark's bribery scandal several years earlier, the
121. Malone, supra n. 20, at 173.
122. Id.
123. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 174.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 175.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting The Idaho State Tribune).
129. State ex rel. Mont. Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 77 P. 312, 318 (Mont. 1904).
130. Id. at 313.
131. Id. at 313-314.
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Great Shutdown of 1903 "called national attention to the prostitution of the
commonwealth of Montana by mining interests."132 But this time judicial
corruption was the root cause, even though quid pro quo bribery was never
proven.
Finally, the "Montana situation,"133 a euphemism for the corruption
that pervaded almost every aspect of the State's culture and politics, had
one more lasting impact. It led the residents of Montana to rise up in 1912,
and pass the Corrupt Practices Act by citizen initiative. 134 As discussed
below, that public response to the degradation of Montana politics at the
hands of corporate interests is the basis for the Montana Supreme Court's
holding that Citizens United did not require it to declare unconstitutional
Montana's ban on corporate campaign expenditures.
III. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES: CITIZENS
UNITED, CAPERTON, AND WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP
At a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections has reached a
fever pitch . . . the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and
union general treasury spending in these races.
-Justice John Paul Stevens 3 5
We figured out a long time ago that it's easier to elect seven judges than to
elect 132 legislators.
-Anonymous AFL-CIO official' 3 6
In addition to the widespread criticism of the majority opinion in Citi-
zens United as judicial activism,'37 a second criticism has focused on its
failure to distinguish between elections for political office and elections for
judicial office.138 That failure is surprising because Justice Kennedy, who
wrote the 5-4 majority opinion in Citizens United, also wrote the 5-4 ma-
jority opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court's recent case
on judicial bias.' 39 There is a pronounced disconnect between the two
132. Malone, supra n. 20, at 174.
133. MacMillan, supra n. 27, at 173.
134. Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 201.
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent).
136. Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections, 2000-2009: Decade of Change 9 (Bren-
nan Center for Justice 2008) (available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/dO9ldc9llbd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.
pdf) (accessed on Nov. 5, 2011) (quoting anonymous AFL-CIO official).
137. See supra nn. 3-13.
138. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 581,
611 (2011) (noting the "conflict between Citizens United and the Court's recent jurisprudence related to
money and judicial elections").
139. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
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opinions, despite their close proximity and common author.14 0 That discon-
nect provides the necessary opening to uphold Montana's ban on indepen-
dent corporate expenditures as applied to judicial elections, 14 1 even if the
United States Supreme Court concludes, as seems likely, that the ban is
unconstitutional in political elections. In other words, the Court should do
what it failed to do in Citizens United: recognize that judicial elections need
greater protection from corruption, including the appearance of it, than po-
litical elections.
A. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are
not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. . . . Our
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic
duty, to take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious
effects of corporate spending in local and national races.
-Justice John Paul Stevensl 42
Citizens United has been criticized almost as much for the way the
Court reached its result as for the result itself. The case concerned a 90-
minute documentary, Hillary: The Movie, produced by Citizens United, a
non-profit corporation.1 4 3 The documentary was a critical biography of
Senator Hillary Clinton, who was then running for president.144 Federal
law at the time, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, prohibited corporations from making ei-
ther direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that ex-
pressly advocated for the election or defeat of candidates for certain federal
offices.145 The Supreme Court had upheld a similar law at the state level in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.14 6 Additionally, § 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") had amended § 441b
to prohibit corporations from publicly distributing via radio or television
any "electioneering communication" referring to a federal candidate, even if
140. Because Justice Kennedy not only wrote both opinions but also was the only Justice who voted
with the majority in each decision, responsibility for this disconnect, or "incoherence," can be placed
directly at his feet. See Hasen, supra n. 138, at 613-615.
141. See Norman L. Greene, How Great Is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into
The Supreme Court's Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications For Judicial Elec-
tions, And Their Effect on The Rule of Law in The United States, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 873, 916 (Spring
2010) (noting the likelihood of "the Supreme Court exempting judicial elections from Citizens United on
the basis of its threat to an impartial judiciary is unclear, particularly given the current makeup of the
Court."); see also infra n. 258.
142. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
143. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886-887 (majority).
144. Id. at 887.
145. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
146. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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it did not expressly advocate for or against the candidate, within 30 days of
a primary election or 60 days of a general election.14 7 Relying on Austin,
the Court had previously upheld that provision in McConnell v. FEC.'4 8
Fearing that distributing Hillary would violate § 441b, Citizens United
brought a declaratory judgment action against the FEC and sought a prelim-
inary injunction barring enforcement of the law. Citizens United argued
that the prohibition on independent corporate expenditures was unconstitu-
tional and also challenged the constitutionality of the statute's disclaimer
and disclosure requirements.1 4 9 In its complaint, Citizens United alleged
that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Hil-
lary.15 0 After the preliminary injunction was denied by the three-judge
panel of the district court authorized to hear challenges to the law, Citizens
United appealed directly to the Supreme Court as allowed,151 but the appeal
was denied.152 Citizens United then stipulated with the FEC to dismiss its
facial challenge in the district court, after the FEC had said it would need
more time to gather the evidence necessary to refute such a broad claim.' 5 3
The three-judge panel subsequently granted the FEC summary judgment,
and Citizens United again appealed directly to the Supreme Court.15 4 In its
notice of appeal, Citizens United expressly stated that it was raising only an
as-applied challenge.' 5 5 The case was briefed and argued on that basis.
Subsequently, the Court sua sponte ordered the parties to submit sup-
plemental briefs addressing whether § 441b was facially invalid and
whether the Court should also overrule Austin and the part of McConnell
that upheld the ban on electioneering communications in BCRA.156 The
5-4 majority opinion ultimately answered those questions affirmatively,
concluding that § 441b's prohibition on independent expenditures
amounted to an "outright ban" on corporate speech.'5 7 The Court did, by
an 8-1 vote with only Justice Clarence Thomas dissenting, uphold the dis-
claimer and disclosure requirements of the law.' 58
147. 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2).
148. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203-209 (2003).
149. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
150. Id. at 892.
151. Id. at 886-887; 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
152. Citizens United v. FEC, 552 U.S. 1278 (2008).
153. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
154. Id. at 887 (majority).
155. Id. at 931-932 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
156. Id. at 888 (majority).
157. Id. at 897.
158. Id. at 917.
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The dissenting Justices harshly characterized the unusual procedure
the majority used to declare the statute unconstitutional: "Essentially, five
justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, so they
changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law."' 5 9
Although the majority opinion spends pages defending its decision to de-
cide the case on the broadest possible basis even though neither party had
argued for that, it only cursorily addressed the most significant problem
with its decision: the lack of the detailed factual record usually required to
determine that no circumstances exist under which a statute would be con-
stitutional. As the dissent explained:
The problem goes still deeper, for the Court does all of this on the basis of
pure speculation. Had Citizens United maintained a facial challenge, and thus
argued that there are virtually no circumstances in which BCRA § 203 can be
applied constitutionally, the parties could have developed, through the normal
process of litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual
burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and unions. ...
In this case, the record is not simply incomplete or unsatisfactory; it is nonex-
istent. Congress crafted BCRA in response to a virtual mountain of research
on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to avert. The Court now
negates Congress' efforts without a shred of evidence on how § 203 or its
state-law counterparts have been affecting any entity other than Citizens
United. 160
The lack of a developed record, especially regarding the extent and
impact of corruption, gravely concerned states like Montana that had simi-
lar laws and their own experiences with electoral corruption. The Montana
Attorney General's Office took the lead in writing and filing an amicus
brief on behalf of 26 states after the Court ordered rehearing. 16 1 The states
urged the Court not to resolve the case on a facial challenge: "The sparse
record below is particularly ill-suited to a facial challenge that would call
into question the century of state and federal laws and decisions that led to
Austin."1 6 2 The undeveloped record in Citizens United, juxtaposed against
the extensive and unique history of corruption that led Montanans to enact
the Corrupt Practices Act, is at the heart of the Montana Supreme Court's
reasoning as to why Western Tradition did not have to be decided the same
way as Citizens United.163
159. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 932 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
160. Id. at 933 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnotes omitted).
161. See Amici Curiae Br. of the states of Montana, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
162. Id. at 4.
163. West. Tradition Partn. P.3d at , 2011 WL 6888567 at *5.
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The majority rejected the states' entreaty, asserting without apparent
irony that because it had reviewed an extensive record when it had held the
same statute constitutional in McConnell, it had all the record it needed to
declare the statute unconstitutional seven years later.16 4 That reasoning be-
comes even more questionable when one looks at what the majority in Mc-
Connell concluded about that same record. In his dissent in McConnell,
Justice Kennedy unsuccessfully argued for the same narrow view of corrup-
tion that ultimately prevailed in Citizens United based on what that Court's
5-4 majority said was its review of the record in McConnell.'6 5 Yet the
reason the majority in McConnell rejected Kennedy's dissent in that case
was because the record, in the majority's view, provided ample support for
upholding § 213 of BCRA: "This crabbed view of corruption, and particu-
larly of the appearance of corruption, ignores precedent, common sense,
and the realities ofpoliticalfundraising exposed by the record in this litiga-
tion." 66 As noted earlier, this "crabbed view" of corruption also ignores the
Framers' understanding of corruption and the dangers they believed it
posed to the nation.16 7
Despite the lack of a record in Citizens United or citations to any em-
pirical evidence in support of its holding, the majority in Citizens United
reached several remarkably sweeping conclusions about the impact of cor-
ruption on the electoral process.16 8 The first was the Court's categorical
assertion "that independent expenditures, including those made by corpora-
tions, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."' 6 9
The Court also held that the only "sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption . . . was
limited to quid pro quo corruption."170 In other words, the only corruption
the government has a compelling interest in preventing is outright bribery.
Additionally, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that speakers may have influ-
ence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are
corrupt: 'Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable in representative
politics.' "'71 And finally, the Court stated: "there is only scant evidence
164. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 894 (majority).
165. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291-292 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 152 (majority) (emphasis added).
167. See Teachout, supra n. 44, at 165-166.
168. As one commentator noted: "How contributions may appear and whether contributions may
actually give rise to corruption seem to be questions of fact not readily resolvable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's decision in that regard appears arbitrary and troublesome." Greene, supra n. 141,
at 920-921.
169. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 910 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
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that independent expenditures even ingratiate. Ingratiation and access, in
any event, are not corruption." 7 2
The dissenting Justices found the majority's view of corruption narrow
and unrealistic, and they said it ignored both precedent and the record from
McConnell on which the majority claimed to have relied:
Corruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the
difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not
kind. And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special
preference to those who spent money on one's behalf. Corruption operates
along a spectrum, and the majority's apparent belief that quid pro quo ar-
rangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does
not accord with the theory or reality of politics. It certainly does not accord
with the record Congress developed in passing BCRA, a record that stands as
a remarkable testament to the energy and ingenuity with which corporations,
unions, lobbyists, and politicians may go about scratching each other's
backs-and which amply supported Congress' determination to target a lim-
ited set of especially destructive practices.' 7 3
As for the majority's additional pronouncement that "[t]he appearance
of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose
faith in our democracy,"17 4 the dissent labeled that wishful thinking by judi-
cial "fiat." 7 5 "The electorate itself has consistently indicated otherwise,
both in opinion polls and in the laws its representatives have passed, and
our colleagues have no basis for elevating their own optimism into a tenet
of constitutional law." 7 6 Finally, and most significantly for purposes of
this article, the dissent also noted that the majority's narrow view of corrup-
tion was in conflict with its decision in Caperton the year before.' 77
B. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Company
The citizen's respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court's
absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the
highest order.
-Justice Anthony Kennedy17 8
172. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
173. Id. at 961 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 910 (majority).
175. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 963 n. 64 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part).
176. Id. (citations omitted); see also Greene, supra n. 141, at 921 ("Finding a set of facts by fiat
essentially creates a 'new reality'-the way things are-which may or may not be true . . . ."). Of
course, one might note that if Montana's citizenry had not lost faith in their state's democracy, 77
percent of them would not have enacted the Corrupt Practices Act by citizen initiative in 1912. See
Malone & Roeder, supra n. 18, at 201.
177. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967-968 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
178. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The Court's 2009 decision in Caperton also received widespread me-
dia coverage, but not because it overturned decades of law or arguably un-
dermined democracy. Instead, Caperton generated unusual public interest
because its backstory was so compelling that novelist John Grisham drew
upon the case179 for his courtroom thriller, The Appeal.s 0 Hugh Caperton
owned a small mining company that sued mining giant A.T. Massey Coal
Company for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations. 81 A West Virginia jury awarded
Caperton $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages in 2002.182 In
June 2004, the trial court denied Massey Coal's post-trial motions challeng-
ing the verdict and damage award, writing that Massey Coal had "intention-
ally acted in utter disregard of [Caperton's] rights and ultimately destroyed
[Caperton's] businesses because, after conducting cost-benefit analyses,
[Massey] concluded it was in its financial interest to do so."t8 3 Massey
Coal eventually appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court.18 4
Before the appeal was heard, West Virginia held a partisan election for
a seat on its Supreme Court, in which the incumbent, Justice Warren Mc-
Graw, a Democrat, was running for re-election.18 5 His opponent was Re-
publican lawyer Brent Benjamin.18 6 Knowing the West Virginia Supreme
Court would eventually review Caperton's judgment, Don Blankenship,
Massey Coal's chairman, CEO, and president, threw his considerable
wealth behind challenger Benjamin. Besides making the $1,000 maximum
contribution allowed by state law directly to Benjamin's campaign, Blank-
enship gave almost $2.5 million to a non-profit organization created to op-
pose McGraw and support Benjamin.8 7 The group, named "And For the
Sake of The Kids," ran ads suggesting that McGraw had voted to let "a
child rapist go free" to work in the schools.' 8 Blankenship's contribution
to the group amounted to more than two-thirds of the money the group
raised.18 9 Additionally, Blankenship spent another $500,000 of his own
money on independent expenditures for direct mailings and advertisements,
179. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA Today, http://www.usa
today.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-courtN.htm (Feb. 16, 2009).
180. John Grisham, The Appeal (Doubleday 2008).
181. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
182. Id.
183. Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Biskupic, supra n. 179.
187. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
188. Robert Barnes, Case May Define When a Judge Must Recuse Self, The Washington Post, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/01/AR2009030102265.html?hpid=topnews&
sid=ST2009030201125 (Mar. 2, 2009).
189. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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bringing the total amount he personally spent to support Benjamin's elec-
tion to more than $3 million,' 90 all but $1,000 in independent expenditures.
That was more than the total spent by all other Benjamin supporters com-
bined and three times as much as Benjamin's own campaign committee
spent.191 Benjamin defeated McGraw with 53 percent of the vote.19 2
In 2005, Caperton asked then-Justice Benjamin to recuse himself from
hearing Massey Coal's appeal due to Blankenship's contributions, but Ben-
jamin refused. 19 3 In 2007, Benjamin voted with the 3-2 majority to reverse
Caperton's $50 million verdict against Massey Coal.19 4 Although the opin-
ion found that Massey Coal's conduct warranted the damages awarded, it
reversed the trial court for two questionable reasons. First, the Court held
that a forum-selection clause, in a contract to which Massey Coal was not a
party, barred the suit in West Virginia. Second, the Court also held that res
judicata barred the suit based on an out-of-state judgment to which Massey
Coal also was not a party.19 5 Caperton sought a rehearing and moved again
to disqualify not just Benjamin, but also another justice after photos came to
light showing that justice vacationing in the French Riviera with Blanken-
ship while the appeal was pending.19 6 Meanwhile, Massey Coal moved to
disqualify one of the two dissenting justices for publicly criticizing Blank-
enship over his spending in the 2004 election.19 7 Both the justice who va-
cationed with Blankenship and the dissenting justice who criticized Blank-
enship recused themselves.198 In his memorandum granting Massey Coal's
recusal motion, the dissenting justice urged Justice Benjamin to also recuse
himself because "Blankenship's bestowal of his personal wealth, political
tactics, and 'friendship' have created a cancer in the affairs of this
Court." 99 Benjamin again refused.2 0 0
Benjamin, now serving as acting chief justice, selected two judges to
replace the recused justices, and the Court granted rehearing. 201 Caperton
requested for the third time that Benjamin recuse himself, this time citing a
poll showing that two-thirds of West Virginians did not think he would
decide the case impartially. 202 Benjamin again refused, and the Court again
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2257-2258.
194. Id.
195. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citation omitted).
200. Id.
201. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
202. Id.
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reversed Caperton's verdict by a 3-2 vote, with the two dissenting justices
writing that "'[n]ot only is the majority opinion unsupported by the facts
and existing case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair'" and therefore
raised federal due process concerns. 203
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in another
5-4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, agreed with the dissenting jus-
tices' assessment and reversed the West Virginia Supreme Court. 20 4 "[T]he
risk that Blankenship's influence engendered actual bias," Kennedy wrote,
"is sufficiently substantial that it 'must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.'" 20 5 That was true, even though
"there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement," 2 0 6 because "Justice
Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his
extraordinary efforts to get him elected." 2 0 7
Caperton involved a due process challenge to a judge's refusal to re-
cuse himself over bias allegedly created by the large independent expendi-
tures of an individual with an interest in the litigation. So at first glance the
case might not seem especially relevant to the issue in Citizens United of
whether restrictions on independent campaign expenditures by corporations
violate the First Amendment. That is essentially how the majority in Citi-
zens United summarily dismissed the dissent's argument that the results of
the two cases were at odds with each other.208 Caperton "is not to the
contrary," the majority wrote, because its "holding was limited to the rule
that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could
be banned." 209
But as explained below, despite the limited nature of the holding in
Caperton, the Court's conclusions about the corrosive effect of large inde-
pendent campaign expenditures in that case is inconsistent with the broad
statements about the lack of harm from those same expenditures in Citizens
United. The disconnect between the two cases' statements about corruption
provides an opportunity for the Supreme Court in American Tradition Part-
203. Id. (citation omitted).
204. Id. at 2256. 2267.
205. Id. at 2264 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
206. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
207. Id. at 2262. This "debt of gratitude" rationale has drawn substantial criticism, with one com-
mentator calling it a "humdinger" due to its potential ramifications, including the notion of a debt of
ingratitude. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After Re-
publican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2011)
("[I]f Benjamin had lost and his opponent won, must that opponent recuse himself because the opponent
would feel ingratitude or animosity against Blankenship?"). The possibility of a debt of ingratitude is,
of course, one more reason why large independent expenditures in judicial campaigns are problematic.
208. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967-968 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
209. Id. at 910 (majority).
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nership to address that inconsistency by upholding Montana's Corrupt Prac-
tices Act at least as applied to judicial elections.2 10
C. Western Tradition Partnership v. Attorney General
What was true a century ago is as true today: distant corporate interests
mean that corporate dominated campaigns will only work "in the essential
interest of outsiders with local interests a very secondary consideration."
-Professor Emeritus Harry FritZ211
After Citizens United was decided, Western Tradition Partnership-a
Colorado corporation-and two small Montana corporations sued to over-
turn Montana Code Annotated § 13-35-227(1).212 That statute provides:
"A corporation may not make a contribution or an expenditure in connec-
tion with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a
candidate or political party." 2 13 Western Tradition Partnership focused its
challenge on the ban against corporate independent expenditures, not the
ban against direct contributions.214 To defend the statute during summary
judgment proceedings, the Attorney General submitted testimony about
Montana's history of corruption via an affidavit from Harry Fritz, professor
emeritus of history at the University of Montana and former Montana legis-
lator in both the House and Senate.215 Fritz's uncontroverted testimony es-
tablished that "[f]or two decades around the turn of the Twentieth Century,
William Clark and his fellow 'Copper Kings' suffocated Montana's public
sphere through the influence of their mining corporations" and "dominated
political debate in Montana . . . drown[ing] out Montanans' own voices in
the political process." 216 Fritz cited the incidents surrounding Clark's 1899
bribery campaign to become a United States Senator,2 17 the corruption in
the Butte trial courts,2 18 and the Great Shutdown of 1903 after Judge
Clancy had ruled against Amalgamated Copper one too many times.2 19
210. See infra nn. 241-265.
211. St.'s Combined Br. Opposition Pl.s' Mot. S.J. & Supporting St.'s Mot. S.J., Aff. Dr. Harry Fritz
at 1 29, West. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen., 2010 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist.
Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Aff. Fritz] (citation omitted).
212. West. Tradition Parin., _ P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *1. Western Tradition's sole
corporate purpose apparently is "to act as a conduit of funds for persons and entities including corpora-
tions who want to spend money anonymously to influence Montana elections." Id.
213. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227(l) (2011).
214. West. Tradition Parin., - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *3.
215. Aff. Fritz, supra n. 211, at 1-3.
216. Id. at 17-18.
217. See supra nn. 52-70.
218. See supra nn. 71-120.
219. See supra nn. 121-132.
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Fritz described the Great Shutdown as "naked corporate blackmail of a sov-
ereign state, and Montanans never forgot it."220
As a result of that corruption, Montanans amended Montana's Consti-
tution in 1906, and granted themselves the right to enact laws through citi-
zen initiative "after decades of trying to take back their state from corporate
interests." 2 2 1 Six years later, they used the power of initiative to enact
Montana's Corrupt Practices Act, with 77 percent of Montana voters in
favor. 222 The Act stated that no corporation or individual holding the ma-
jority of stock in any corporation "shall pay or contribute in order to aid,
promote or prevent the nomination or election of any person, or in order to
aid or promote the interests, success or defeat of any political party or or-
ganization." 2 2 3 Fritz testified that the Corrupt Practices Act "reflected
Montanans opposition to, and intolerance of abuses that grew out of corpo-
rate revolution of the late 19th century, including the power wielded by the
'Copper Kings' of Montana and other powerful corporate interests." 224
Fritz's expert testimony made no difference to the district court. In
granting summary judgment to Western Tradition Partnership, Judge Sher-
lock questioned the relevance of Montana's history of corruption by suc-
cinctly noting that "the Copper Kings are a long time gone to their
tombs." 2 2 5 Citing Citizens United, Judge Sherlock then rejected all of the
State's arguments as to why it had a compelling interest in prohibiting inde-
pendent corporate expenditures, noting that Montana's law was even
broader than § 441b.2 2 6
On December 30, 2011, the Montana Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that Montana, based on its history of corrupt elections, had a suffi-
ciently compelling reason to justify prohibiting independent corporate ex-
penditures. In a 5-2 decision authored by Chief Justice Mike McGrath, the
Court distinguished Western Tradition from Citizens United because "un-
like Citizens United, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections
and it arises from Montana history." 227 Stating that "the factual record
before a court is critical to determining the validity of a governmental pro-
vision restricting speech," the Court rejected the assertion by the lower
court and the two dissenting justices that "Citizens United holds unequivo-
220. Aff. Fritz, supra n. 211, at 16.
221. Id. at 1 24.
222. Id. at 1 4.
223. Id. at 25.
224. Id. at 5.
225. West. Tradition Partn., 210 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 412 at *10-14.
226. Id.
227. West. Tradition Partn., _ P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *5.
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cally that no sufficient government interest justifies limits on political
speech."2 2 8
Instead, the Court interpreted Citizens United as only requiring the
traditional case-by-case determination of whether a particular restriction on
speech was justified by a compelling interest. The Court held that Mon-
tana's history more than met that test:
[T]he State of Montana, or more accurately its voters, clearly had a compel-
ling interest to enact the challenged statute in 1912. At that time the State of
Montana and its government were operating under a mere shell of legal au-
thority, and the real social and political power was wielded by powerful cor-
porate managers to further their own business interests. The voters had more
than enough of the corrupt practices and heavy-handed influence asserted by
the special interests controlling Montana's political institutions. Bribery of
public officials and unlimited campaign spending by the mining interests
were commonplace and well known to the public. 229
Given that undisputed and unique history, the Court distilled the ques-
tion of whether Montana's Corrupt Practices Act could survive after Citi-
zens United down to its essence: "The question then, is when in the last 99
years did Montana lose the power or interest sufficient to support the stat-
ute, if it ever did." 230 The Court also noted that although the copper kings
are indeed long gone, Montana remains particularly susceptible to harm
from large corporate political expenditures:
Issues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence upon agriculture
and extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor,
and low campaign costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued
efforts of corporate control to the detriment of democracy and the republican
form of government. Clearly Montana has unique and compelling interests to
protect through preservation of this statute.23 1
Finally, the Court identified two other compelling interests that sup-
ported the statute. The first is encouraging the full participation of the elec-
torate by ensuring that Montana voters' relatively small contributions to
candidates still have an impact. "[U]nlimited corporate money would irrev-
ocably change the dynamic of local Montana political office races, which
have historically been characterized by the low-dollar, broad-based cam-
paigns run by Montana candidates." 2 3 2
The second additional compelling interest is protecting the integrity of
the State's system of electing judges. That means not only ensuring that the
judiciary is fair and impartial, but also "preserving the appearance of judi-
cial propriety and independence so as to maintain the public's trust and
228. Id.
229. Id. at *11.
230. Id. at *12.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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confidence." 233 The Court held that Montana's judicial elections would be
particularly vulnerable to large corporate expenditures because of their tra-
ditionally low-cost campaigns, such as the 2008 campaign for chief justice
in which total media expenditures were less than $60,000.
It is clear that an entity like Massey Coal, willing to spend even hundreds of
thousands of dollars, much less millions, on a Montana judicial election could
effectively drown out all other voices. The historic Heinze-Anaconda conflict
noted above illustrates the obvious negative and corrupting effects of a
"bought" judiciary. 234
One of the more interesting aspects of the Western Tradition decision
is that while the majority opinion rejects the idea that Citizens United dic-
tates the outcome, it is one of the dissenting opinions that engages in a
blistering attack on Citizens United's reasoning. As one Supreme Court re-
porter put it, Justice James C. Nelson "unloaded on that Supreme Court
decision with Scalia-like levels of derision and scorn." 2 3 5 Although I rec-
ommend Nelson's dissent be read in full to truly appreciate its angry popu-
lism, one can get a sense of the tone from the conclusion, where he ridicules
the idea that corporations are "persons" under the law and have many of the
same rights as real people:
I find the entire concept offensive. Corporations are artificial creatures of law.
As such, they should enjoy only those powers-not constitutional rights, but
legislatively-conferred powers-that are concomitant with their legitimate
function, that being limited-liability investment vehicles for business. Corpo-
rations are not persons. Human beings are persons, and it is an affront to the
inviolable dignity of our species that courts have created a legal fiction which
forces people-human beings-to share fundamental, natural rights with
soulless creations of government. Worse still, while corporations and human
beings share many of the same rights under the law, they clearly are not
bound equally to the same codes of good conduct, decency, and morality, and
they are not held equally accountable for their sins. Indeed, it is truly ironic
that the death penalty and hell are reserved only to natural persons. 236
Justice Nelson was also offended by the idea that before Citizens
United corporations were unable to have their voices heard in politics:
[T]he notion that corporations are disadvantaged in the political realm is un-
believable. Indeed, it has astounded most Americans. The truth is that corpo-
rations wield inordinate power in Congress and in state legislatures. It is hard
233. West. Tradition Partn., - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at **12-13.
234. Id. at *14.
235. Dahlia Lithwick, In Montana, Corporations Aren't People: Can Montana Get Away With Defy-
ing the Supreme Court on Citizens United?, Slate http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/juris-
prudence/2012/01/montana.supreme.courtcitizens unitedcanmontana-get-away-withdefyingthe
.supreme court_.html (Jan. 4, 2012) (accessed Mar. 2, 2012).
236. West. Tradition Partn., - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *41 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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to tell where government ends and corporate America begins; the transition is
seamless and overlapping. 237
Nevertheless, Justice Nelson wrote that even though he thought Mon-
tana had established several compelling interests sufficient to uphold the
Corrupt Practices Act, each of them had been raised by the dissenters in
Citizens United and rejected by the majority. Finding himself "in the dis-
tasteful position of having to defend the applicability of a controlling prece-
dent with which [he] profoundly disagree[d]," 238 Justice Nelson chastised
his colleagues in the majority for failing in their duty to follow the Supreme
Court's binding precedent. "Like it or not, Citizens United is the law of the
land as regards corporate political speech. There is no 'Montana excep-
tion.' "239
Given the sweep of the majority opinion in Citizens United, Justice
Nelson is likely correct 240 that the Supreme Court will reject the argument
that Montana's unique past exempts it from the broad holding in Citizens
United that "the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis
of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest jus-
tifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corpora-
tions." 241
D. Caperton v. Citizens United: Judicial Elections Are Different
Judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain things in exchange
for votes.
-Chief Justice John G. RobertS242
While the United States Supreme Court will likely be unwilling to re-
verse itself and allow prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures
generally, it should be willing to articulate a different rule in the context of
judicial elections due to the disconnect between Citizens United and
Caperton. That disconnect arises from two striking inconsistencies in the
237. Id. at *39.
238. Id. at *21.
239. Id. at *22.
240. But one leading campaign finance expert, Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, who
clerked for Justice Scalia, recently stated that he was "confident" the Court will soon reverse Citizens
United. "I think it's quite likely Justice Kennedy is about to flip," Lessig said, adding that Kennedy "is
completely surprised by how much damage this decision has done--even Scalia doesn't like the world
where all the money in the world is on one side." Corbin Hiar, Lawrence Lessig on Campaign Finance
Reform: Overturning 'Citizens United' Isn't Enough, The Center for Public Integrity, http://www.i
watchnews.org/201 2/02/2 9 /82 7 8 /lawrence-lessig-campaign-finance-reform-overtuming-citizens-united-
isnt-enough?utmsource=lWatch&utm medium=socialmedia&utmcampaign=twitter (Feb. 29, 2012).
241. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
242. John G. Roberts Jr., Confirmation Hearing Opening Statement, Transcript: Day One of the
Roberts Hearings http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091306
93.html (Sept. 13, 2005).
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opinions. Examining those inconsistencies suggests that if confronted
squarely with the issue of independent corporate expenditures in judicial
elections, a majority of the Court might be willing to recognize what seems
obvious to many-judicial elections really are different and should be
treated that way under campaign finance law.2 4 3
The first inconsistency is the way the two opinions characterize the
independent expenditures at issue in each case. In Citizens United, the
Court followed the longstanding distinction in its cases between contribu-
tions made directly to candidates and independent expenditures made with-
out coordination with the candidates' campaigns. The Court has long held
that direct contributions, because of the risk of quid pro quo corruption they
pose, can be restricted in amount in the case of individuals and banned
entirely in the case of corporations and unions. 24 4 But when it comes to
independent expenditures, individuals like Don Blankenship cannot be re-
stricted in any way in deciding how they independently spend their money,
as long as they do not coordinate with a campaign. After Citizens United,
corporations also are not restricted in their independent expenditures, but
they still cannot make direct contributions to candidates. So the distinction
between contributions and expenditures remains a crucial one.2 4 5
But not in Caperton. There, the Court ignored its longstanding distinc-
tion, and instead repeatedly referred to Blankenship's $3 million in inde-
pendent expenditures as "contributions" to Justice Benjamin's campaign. 246
As the dissenters in Citizens United noted, the Caperton majority had
accepted the premise that, at least in some circumstances, independent ex-
penditures on candidate elections will raise an intolerable specter of quid pro
quo corruption. Indeed, this premise struck the Court as so intuitive that it
repeatedly referred to Blankenship's spending on behalf of Benjamin-spend-
ing that consisted of 99.97% independent expenditures ($3 million) and
0.03% direct contributions ($1,000)-as a "contribution." 24 7
The majority's response to the dissent on this point was so brief that it
has been described as "curt and dismissive," as well as "unpersuasive." 2 4 8
Rather than respond directly to the dissent's point, the majority focused
solely on the remedy involved: "Caperton's holding was limited to the rule
243. A decade ago, four Justices indicated they would be open to recognizing that difference, al-
though two of them have since retired. See Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 805 (Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (the Court should "differentiate elections for political of-
fices, in which the First Amendment holds full sway, from elections designed to select those whose
office it is to administer justice without respect to persons.").
244. See Rotunda, supra n. 207, at 58-61.
245. Id.
246. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967-968 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Sotomayor, JJ., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part).
247. Id. at 967.
248. Hasen, supra n. 138, at 612.
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that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could
be banned." 2 4 9 Given the opportunity by the dissent to explain its confla-
tion of independent expenditures with direct contributions, and thus address
head-on the question of whether judicial elections are different from politi-
cal elections, the majority passed, leaving the question open for a future
case.
The blurring of any difference between contributions and expenditures
suggests that in the context of judicial elections, the Caperton majority-
and particularly Justice Kennedy, the swing vote and author in both Citizens
United and Caperton-sees little difference between the two methods of
financially supporting a candidate in terms of the risk of corruption they
pose, and it chose to use the terms synonymously to make that point.2 5 0
That suggestion draws further support from the majority's recognition that
"'public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected
judges'. . . . is a vital state interest." 2 5 1 Compare that statement to state-
ments in Citizens United that "[t]he fact that speakers may have influence
over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are
corrupt,"252 and "there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures
even ingratiate. . . . Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not corrup-
tion." 2 5 3 While the majority in Citizens United might believe influence
over, ingratiation with, and access to politicians by campaign supporters is
not corruption, it almost defies belief to think all of them would believe the
same about elected judges, given the state's vital interest in public confi-
dence in judicial fairness and integrity.
The second inconsistency is the two cases' conflicting views on
whether independent expenditures even pose a risk of corruption. In Citi-
zens United, the majority opinion held categorically that "independent ex-
penditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption," 254 although the actual basis for the
certainty of that counterintuitive assertion is never made clear. The major-
ity also asserted, again without support, that "[t]he appearance of influence
or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy." 255 Yet in Caperton, decided just seven months earlier, the
Court held that large independent expenditures in support of a judicial can-
didate could create "a serious, objective risk of actual bias" that violated an
249. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (majority).
250. In fact, one could argue that independent expenditures, because they are not subject to dollar
limits like most contributions, are more corrosive.
251. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266 (citations omitted).
252. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 909.
255. Id. at 910.
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opposing litigant's due process rights. 2 5 6 To reach that conclusion, the ma-
jority had to reject the categorical assertions about independent expendi-
tures that it would make a few months later in Citizens United. To deter-
mine that Don Blankenship's independent expenditures on behalf of Justice
Benjamin required the justice to recuse himself, those expenditures by defi-
nition had to "give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption," or at
least run the risk of "caus[ing] the electorate to lose faith in our democ-
racy," or both.2 5 7 Yet Citizens United would soon tell us with certainty that
neither could happen.
Taken together, these inconsistencies suggest that the Court, or at least
Justice Kennedy, is willing to scrutinize judicial elections with a different,
brighter light than political elections when it comes to the corrupting influ-
ence of large amounts of money flowing into them.258 The possibility that
Justice Kennedy recognizes that judicial elections are different should not
surprise because, after all, numerous other knowledgeable people and
groups believe just that. Those groups include the Conference of Chief
Justices, which consists of the highest judicial officer in each state, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and each United States commonwealth and territory. 259
In 2007, it adopted a declaration bluntly entitled Judicial Elections Are Dif-
ferent From Other Elections, in which it condemned the impact of increas-
ingly large sums of money injected into state judicial elections. 260 That
trend "threaten[s] to damage and possibly even destroy the systems that
individual states have adopted to keep judicial elections different from elec-
tions for other elective officials."2 6 1
That threat also led five former justices of the Montana Supreme Court
to file an amicus brief in Western Tradition, urging the Court to uphold this
State's ban on independent corporate expenditures in judicial elections, re-
gardless of how it ruled on the statute as a whole. They noted that,
"[m]embers of legislative and executive branches are meant to be respon-
256. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
257. Hasen, supra n. 138, at 583. 613.
258. In his dissent in Western Tradition, Justice Nelson concluded it was unlikely the Court would
carve out an exception to Citizens United for judicial elections based on Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Republican Party ofMinnesota that states cannot "censor what the people hear as they under-
take to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer." West.
Tradition Partn., - P.3d at _, 2011 WL 6888567 at *41 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Repub.
Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 794) (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, Justice Kennedy's next sentence
provides the opening for a judicial exception to that rule by narrowing it to the facts of the case, which
concerned restrictions on the speech of the judicial candidates themselves, not corporations seeking to
elect sympathetic judges. "Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, not the
State." Repub. Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
259. Conf. of Chief Justices, About CCJ, http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/about.html (accessed Oct. 8, 2011).
260. Conf. of Chief Justices, Declaration: Judicial Elections Are Different From Other Elections,
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/JudicialSelectionResolutions/DeclarationJudicialElections.html (Feb. 7, 2007).
261. Id.
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sive to the interests of their constituents. On the other hand, despite being
popularly elected in nonpartisan elections, judges are expected to be impar-
tial and independent in applying the law to any given circumstance ... ."262
The former justices also pointed out that Alexander Hamilton, one of the
more influential Framers of the Constitution, wrote that "the complete in-
dependence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential" to the United
States' form of government. 263
Perhaps more importantly, given the need for public confidence in the
judiciary, citizens overwhelmingly share the concern about the impact of
money on judicial elections. After Caperton, Professor Lawrence Lessig
observed that even today, despite controversial decisions like Bush v. Gore
and accusations of activist judges with political agendas, the public still
largely "presume[s] the integrity" of the judicial branch of the federal gov-
ernment, while at the same time it largely "presume[s] the corruption" of
Congress. "The difference is enormously important to the health and power
of each: trust in the judicial branch has been steady and strong; trust in the
legislative branch has been falling and weak." 2 6 4 Yet a USA Today/Gallup
Poll taken in February 2009, shortly before Caperton was argued, indicates
that trust in the integrity of elected state judges may be dropping fast. 2 6 5
The poll
found 89% of those surveyed believe the influence of campaign contributions
on judges' rulings is a problem, and 52% deem it a 'major' problem. More
than 90% of the 1,027 adults surveyed said judges should be removed from a
case if it involves an individual or group that contributed to the judge's elec-
tion campaign.266
In other words, today's citizenry does not seem to be buying the majority's
optimistic assertion in Citizens United that "[t]he appearance of influence or
access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy" 267
any more than Montana's citizenry accepted the same premise in 1912,
when 77 percent of them voted to enact via citizen initiative the Corrupt
Practices Act at issue in American Tradition.
262. Amicus Curiae Br. of former Mont. Sup. Ct. Justices William Hunt, William Leaphart, James
Regnier, Terry Trieweiler & John Warner, 11 West. Tradition Partn., 2011 WL 6888567 [hereinafter
Amicus Br. of former Mont. Justices].
263. Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 78 426 (E.H. Scott ed., 1898)).
264. Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 104,
109 (Nov. 2009).
265. Biskupic, supra n. 179.
266. Id.
267. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Even if the Court does not significantly walk back Citizens United, it
should nevertheless resolve that case's conflict with Caperton by expressly
recogniz[ing] that independent spending does have the potential to corrupt,
but that outside the context of judicial elections where we are concerned espe-
cially with the public's confidence in the fairness of the judicial process, the
state's interest in preventing such corruption is outweighed by the considera-
ble First Amendment costs of limiting such spending. 268
As the former Montana justices argued in their Western Tradition amici
brief:
Montana's compelling state interest in preserving the independence and im-
partiality of the judiciary intersects with the anti-corruption interest articu-
lated by the [Attorney General] in this case. As the U.S. Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Caperton, the need to insure judicial elections are free from any
appearance of bias or corruption is unquestionably stronger than the need in
elections for legislative or executive offices.269
Citizens United dismissed concerns about electoral corruption gener-
ally by declaring that just because someone who independently spends large
sums in a campaign "may have influence over or access to elected officials
does not mean that th[o]se officials are corrupt."270 What Citizens United
disregarded is that if the elected officials in question are judges, it means
exactly that.
268. Hasen, supra n. 138, at 615 n. 231.
269. Amicus Br. of former Mont. Justices, supra n. 262, at I.
270. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
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